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Abstract. We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in
contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the ex-
pected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the
normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sen-
sitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack
forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not
to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and
to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different
from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.
1 Introduction
Existing paper-based voting systems are often considered to be the gold standard
against which any other voting system is measured, despite that the classic
systems have security weaknesses.
For example, a certain degree of errors when voters fill in ballots is sometimes
accepted as long as the voters’ intent can still be determined. Similarly, blank
ballots may be allowed to give the possibility to vote for unlisted candidates, or
as a last resort to counter attacks where ballot papers are stolen from a polling
station.
Another example is how the results are reported, e.g., in Norway the results
for voting districts that are deemed too small are reported at an aggregate level
to preserve the privacy of voters. Even when a result for a given voting district
is not needed to compute the distribution of seats, the result is often considered
an important channel of information of the broader democratic system.
? We use “Snowden” as a placeholder for somebody in possession of sensitive informa-
tion and do not in any way suggest that he has any intention to attack any elections.
The recent presidential election in USA 2016 show that there may be other parties
in possession of similar information with the intent to disrupt elections.
However, such weaknesses are typically well known and due to a careful
tradeoff between several conflicting goals such as security, availability, cultural
values and traditions, and economy.
In this paper we introduce a previously unknown type of attack that should
be added to the list of threats to be considered in such tradeoffs. How serious the
attack is depends strongly on the strategic value of the election and how well the
election management body is prepared to handle it. Important factors include
legal, procedural, and the strategic value of causing confusing or a delay in the
tabulation of an election. The vulnerability to the attack of an election depends
both on how ballot papers are designed and marked, and how the election is
tallied.
2 Contribution
We first present a novel attack that can be executed on numerous existing voting
systems with potentially far-reaching and serious implications. Then we identify
the most important parameters of the attack and discuss how and to what extent
the attack can be mitigated.
We hope that this paper will raise the awareness among researchers, govern-
ments, and other stakeholders. Short term, election owners must prepare plans
and procedures to handle an attack. Modest improvements may also be applied
to existing voting systems within current laws. Long term, each voting system
should be studied carefully to see if it is possible to mitigate the attack in a way
that is acceptable from a democratic point of view and election laws should be
changes if needed. Due to the diversity of the details of voting systems, election
schemes, legal frameworks, and democratic cultures, this is out of scope of this
paper.
In this paper we focus on the mechanics of the attack at a high level. We do
not consider the details of specific elections and voting systems to determine how
vulnerable they are to the attack, assess the strategic value of carrying out the
attack, and the threat model. Legal and political aspects are also out of scope
of this paper, but we hope to inspire such research.
In an appendix we consider to what extent the attack can be applied to the
particular voting systems of a handful of countries and informally propose a
number of modest changes that could be deployed quickly to raise the cost to
execute the attack and improve the chance to identify the perpetrator.
3 The Attack
We first observe that most voting systems provide a channel to voters that not
only allow them to express their voting intents, but also to send arbitrary infor-
mation through the voting system. More precisely, given a piece of information,
one or more voters can use their right to vote to encode the information into
the output of the voting system. In this context, the output consists not only of
the tally of the election, but also of all auxiliary information that is published or
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otherwise available, e.g., the number of invalid votes and in what way they are
invalid. Depending on how restricted the access to different parts of the output
is, the attack is more or less feasible. In Section 4 we discuss several examples
of how the information can be encoded depending on the specifics of the voting
system.
Then we assume that the adversary has access to sensitive information that
must not be published by the election authority. Secret information is clearly
sensitive such as information published by WikiLeaks, but other information
which is not particularly secret may also be sensitive. In Section 3.1 we consider
different types of sensitive information.
We also assume that the adversary is able to publish information on “the
Internet” in the sense that the data is made broadly available and can not be
deleted. Today this is a very mild assumption due to the plethora of forums and
servers that store information for free without deep authentication of the users.
Throughout we write Enc(k,m) to denote the encryption of a message m
with a secret key k, and we denote by m the sensitive data. An example of a
suitable cryptosystem is AES. The attack proceeds as follows:
1. The adversary forms a ciphertext c = Enc(k,m) using the sensitive informa-
tion m and a randomly chosen secret key k, and publishes it on the Internet
anonymously.
2. She uses corrupted voters to submit votes that encode the secret key k in
such a way that it can be easily derived from the output of the election after
tallying.
3. She anonymously informs the relevant authorities, and possibly media or
other parties, that if the result is tallied, then the sensitive data m will be
published by the election authority.
4. She makes sure that her claim is credible, e.g., by revealing parts of the
sensitive information to the owner of the election and chosen government
agencies and media.
Example 1. Suppose that the attacker has access to Snowden’s complete in-
formation m and consider an election that allows write-in votes, and that the
contents of all votes are reported in the final result. Here the adversary picks a
random party name p, hashes it to form the key k = H(p), encrypts the sensitive
data to form the ciphertext c = Enc(k,m) which is published on the Internet.
Then it submits p using a write-in vote. Then it informs the election authority
and chosen media. If the election is tallied, then p appears in the result, k = H(p)
can be computed, and the sensitive information m = Dec(k, c) is disclosed.
We stress that the attack is easy to execute completely anonymously, since
the ciphertext c can be published through any electronic channel and the voting
system itself provides privacy to the attacker when k is encoded into the votes.
The attack puts the owner of the election, e.g., a national election authority,
in a situation where they de-facto become fully responsible for publishing the
sensitive information and this is known by a wide audience. This immediate
spawns a number of questions that demands answers:
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– How vulnerable is a given system to the attack?
– What can we do to counter the attack?
– Is it legal to tally, or conversely refuse to tally, and can tallying be delayed?
– Should the election authority tally unconditionally?
– Who is politically and legally responsible for publishing the information?
– Can individuals or organizations demand damages for disclosed information?
3.1 Types of Sensitive Information
Before we consider how the attack differs from extortion we give a number of
examples of sensitive information and discuss how the type of information influ-
ences the characteristics of the attack.
State Secrets. Imagine that a disgruntled officer in the military, or arms industry,
decides to execute the attack. The obvious real world example is somebody like
Edward Snowden, but with a more sinister agenda. The sensitive data may be
worth billions and threaten the lives of many people if it is leaked.
The motivation may be political, either directly to punish the establishment,
or at a national level to punish a foreign state. In the latter case, it may be
clear that the attacker has no intention to leak the information, i.e., the goal is
specifically to stop or delay the election.
We can even imagine an attack that is intended to look like an attack by an
insider, but which in reality is an attack by a corrupt state. It is not far-fetched
that elements of a country like USA or Russia sacrifices a measured amount
of sensitive information and manufactures an insider attack on their own, or
a foreign country, for political purposes. Consider the political pressure these
countries can exert on small states to delay an election if needed.
The motive could also be economical. We would expect that the stock market
reacts quickly if the tallying of the election is delayed. Trading on movements
on the stock market in a covert way is not difficult and could result in huge
revenues. A single individual with access to sensitive information and plausible
deniability could today with little risk of detection execute this attack in several
countries.
Private Information About Voters in the Election. Suppose that the election, or
part of it, is performed using an electronic voting system. Due to lack of analysis
and poor understanding of cryptography and computer security, several such
systems have been broken [6, 3, 4].
Consider a political activist that has repeatedly pointed out vulnerabilities
and tried to convince the authorities to not use the electronic voting system, and
that she in despair decides to grab the secret key, or the votes of many voters,
and use it as the sensitive information in the attack. Note how this differs from
simply proving knowledge of the secret key where the government could dismiss
the complaint with various explanations. Here the election can not be tallied (as
planned) and still preserve the privacy.
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We stress that the attacker has no intention to leak the information and has
no incitement to claim otherwise. The goal is in fact to protect the privacy of
voters.
This would of course be illegal, but it is also a form of whistleblowing on an
election authority that ignores valid criticism through legitimate channels. Thus,
we expect that many citizens would side with the attacker.
Information about how voters cast their votes could also be collected using
something as simple as covertly filming voters in the polling station. The attacker
would then cast her vote among the last in the election.
Illegal Information. Recall that the key feature of the attack is not that the sen-
sitive information is secret, but that the election authority becomes responsible
for publishing it. There are several examples of information that is sometimes
publicly available, but not in aggregated form that allows, e.g., searching, and
such information can be very difficult to collect without detection.
One example is an attacker that holds a large catalogue of child pornography.
Publishing this information would not only be illegal, it could also seriously
harm many children and people emotionally and constitute defamation leading
to lawsuits.
Another example is sensitive user data from, e.g., forums, social media, infi-
delity websites, and perhaps more seriously, medical journals. Disclosing medical
journals is not only problematic because it violates the privacy of people, it can
cause people to lose their jobs and insurance policies. In the case of medical
journals the goal could be to force the government to take action to improve the
privacy properties of systems to protect the citizens.
In both examples, it could be clear that the attacker has no malicious intent
and no intention of publishing the data on her own.
3.2 Is This Simply a Form of Extortion?
One may object that the attack is simply a form of extortion aiming to disrupt
an election, i.e., the attacker could just as well simply explain that if the elec-
tion is tallied, then it will publish the sensitive information. However, there are
prominent features of the attack that distinguishes it from extortion.
An extortionist must convince the victim that the threat is credible, i.e., that
she is willing to publish the data unless the victim stops the election. This is not
the case in our attack. As illustrated in the examples above, it can be clear that
the attacker has no intention to publish the data.
An extortionist can also change its mind. Thus, it is meaningful to negotiate
with her and if she is captured in time, then the attack can be stopped. In our
attack on the other hand, not even the attacker can stop the attack after it has
been set in motion.
We believe that the distinction is of fundamental importance and changes
the way governments can, and should, respond.
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4 Encoding Data Into the Output of the Election
A closer look at a typical voting system reveals that the bandwidth from the
attacker to the output of the election is large. Below we give a non-exhaustive
list of ways to encode information, but note that these may be combined if
available. An additional factor is who is given access to the information and this
is discussed in the next section.
4.1 Write-in Votes
There are two types of votes that are sometimes called write-in, but are quite
different in our setting. Both assume that the voter can use a blank ballot and
simply write on it the name of their favorite candidate.
Type I assumes that the candidate has been registered in advance, so in
the election result such a write-in vote would be indistinguishable from votes
cast using pre-printed ballots. A narrow channel of information is given by such
ballots if available to the observers, since the candidate name may, e.g., be
positioned differently on the ballot paper to encode information, but the ballot
is difficult to spot even given access to the tallying.
Type II allows the voter to write anything on a blank ballot, and as long as
it can be interpreted as something meaningful when it appears in the election
result, it appears in the election result. This can be used directly to execute
the attack if the vote is available to the observers, since the voter can simply
write the secret key k used to encrypt the sensitive information as the candidate
name. To make sure that the key seems meaningful the attacker can first come
up with a randomly chosen name p and hash it to derive the actual secret key k
as explained in Example 1.
4.2 Invalid Votes
In our setting invalid votes can be viewed as a form of write-in votes, but with
limited information capacity. There are numerous ways to make a vote invalid
and how they are processed depends on the type of election, so we can only give
some examples to illustrate the problem. In all variations the observers must of
course be able to record information about invalid votes.
In countries where detailed statistics about different types of invalid votes
are disclosed they are truly a form of write-in votes of Type II in the eyes of the
attacker.
In countries where envelopes are used and the observers may witness the
counting, the attacker can simply put, or not put, post-it notes of different
colors to encode a sequence of bits. Post-it notes stand out in the counting and
are easy to spot.
6
4.3 Bundled Races
Countries that artificially bundle together multiple races create ballots that can
be exploited by encoding the key as a list of components of a few bits, where
each such component represents a choice in a race. For example, a bundled ballot
with three races containing two candidates each can encode three bits. To be of
use a larger number of races and/or multiple candidates is needed, but it is not
merely the number of possible votes that is important. It is the size of the space
of possibilities expected to remain unused by legitimate voters that determines
the feasibility of the attack.
4.4 Ranked Elections
In ranked elections a single ballot is used with a large number of different possible
votes corresponding to the possible permutations of the available candidates.
Variable-basis representations of integers are easily converted to and from more
natural representations of permutations and a key may be viewed as an integer,
so an arbitrary key can be cast as a vote. These ballots cannot in general be
tallied except by revealing a large part of each vote.
4.5 Supporting Evidence
Most voting systems have embedded features for auditing. The auxiliary infor-
mation provided for auditing can provide a channel for the attacker even if the
rest of the election output does not. Thus, the election output must be under-
stood as consisting of all information and all physical artifacts resulting from
the tallying of an election.
4.6 Elections with a Fixed Set of Candidates
Even in single-seat elections where the election output consists only of the re-
ported election results, the attack may be feasible, but at a higher cost to the
adversary in terms of the needed number of corrupted voters. This is best ex-
plained by an example.
Example 2. Consider an election with three fixed candidates where the election
result is reported per voting district among a large number of voting districts.
Assume that the first two candidates get almost all of the votes so that the third
candidates get zero votes in most voting districts.
Here an adversary that controls n voters throughout the voting districts that
typically receives zero votes for the third candidates can encode bits by simply
casting, or abstaining to cast, votes for the third candidate in those districts. A
somewhat more expensive encoding with more cast votes can add error correction
to give voters in those districts plausible deniability. A randomized encoding
where zero and one are instead encoded as, say more or less than two votes,
respectively, gives plausible denial for every individual vote. This may protect
the attacker against sanitation of the result under governing laws, since votes of
legitimate votes can not be eliminated.
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Note that the example does not require the attacker to register new candi-
dates, but the attack is of course facilitated if this is possible, since it almost
guarantees the existence of a candidate that can be expected to get very few
votes. In some countries this is unlikely to be the case due to requirements for
registering new parties or candidates.
The critical weakness of the election is how the result is reported. If there
are only a few large voting districts, then the attack is infeasible.
4.7 Multiple Elections
It is important to understand that the above encodings can not only be combined
with each other, but also for multiple elections. If the adversary is unable to
encode the needed number of bits into one election, then she may still be able to
encode a fraction of the bits in each election. The semantics are changed slightly
with this approach since when a key is partially disclosed outside parties may
be able to recover the remainder of the key using algorithmic methods.
4.8 Access to the Output of the Election
A necessary condition for the attack to succeed is that the sensitive information
is revealed to parties that must not have access to it. However, this is a not
a black or white property. For example, national security and military secrets
should not be disclosed to anybody, but it must not be disclosed to unfriendly
foreign states. Similarly, child pornography can safely, and should be, disclosed
to the Police, but must not fall into the hands of the general public.
Thus, to properly analyze the value of the attack and capabilities of the ad-
versary in a given election, we need a comprehensive and detailed understanding
of the voting system. This is important, since it is likely to be infeasible to
unconditionally mitigate the attack for many election schemes.
The attack relies on the transfer of responsibility. Suppose election workers
perform their duties in a closed room and the encoded key only appears in the
room. Then if the key is disclosed we can argue that the election workers are
culpable and not the election authority or government. This way of looking at
the attack may be more or less realistic depending on the nature of the sensitive
information.
5 Mitigating the Attack
The best we can hope to achieve may seem to be a voting system that outputs
who won the election in a single seat race, or correspondly the distribution of
seats in a multi-seat election, but a closer look at democratic systems shows that
this is view is naive. The role of an election is not only to distribute seats, but
also to communicate the voice of the voters in a broader sense such as fringe
opinions and the geographic distribution of supporters of different candidates.
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Thus, a more modest goal is that the voting system outputs the election
result in the form it is currently output in most voting systems. This can clearly
not be achieved if write-in votes are reported as part of the result without prior
registration. The number of bundled races and cardinality of ranked elections
combined with the number of candidates must also remain small. Furthermore,
the result can only be reported for subsets of voters such that the number of
votes for each candidate is large enough to hide encoded information in statistical
noise provided by the votes of honest voters.
In addition to the above requirements, it must be ensured that no additional
part of the output is leaked to the wrong parties. The specifics of this is inherently
tied to particular elections, but we can make some general observations.
In elections with a voting envelope we can not allow the counting to be
done in public. It is far too simple to insert arbitrary paper content into an
envelope. However, it is probably fine to randomly select people from the general
population to audit the counting and inform them to not leak any information
except that they can dispute the counting.
Statistics about invalid votes should be kept to a minimum and reported in
aggregate form and not per voting district or other small regions. The detailed
statistics and information should be considered secret.
6 Variations
The attack could possibly be combined with a deliberate manipulation of the
election result, and used to dissuade the authorities from publishing information
that would indicate the manipulation. The key may be encoded not in the out-
come, but in the evidence of the correctness of the outcome leading to a situation
where the government is unable to allow a normal audit.
7 Future Work
There are two natural directions for future work. Firstly, understanding vul-
nerabilities and developing techniques and procedures that increase the cost of
executing the attack is certainly possible, both for traditional and electronic
voting systems.
There are also natural theoretical questions to be investigated. A function
for which the adversary provides some of the inputs may be viewed as a channel
in an information theoretical sense and we could demand that its capacity is low
in the worst case, or average case, over the choice of the other inputs. Similarly
to the discussion above, in a multiparty computation of the function, we must
consider the output to be the complete view of the parties interested in the
communicated information.
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A Situation in Selected Countries
To make things more concrete we briefly discuss how serious the attack is in a
handful of countries.
A.1 Australia
Many Australian elections allow each voter to rank many candidates, so each
ballot may have about 100! different possibilities. Furthermore, tallying by Single
Transferable Vote (STV) generally needs knowledge of most of each permutation—
there is no easy way to split up the vote when tallying. Many Australian electoral
authorities make complete voting data available on the web, for the very good
reason that third parties may independently redo the count.
These sorts of voting systems are also vulnerable to a coercion attack some-
times called the “Italian attack”, in which voters are coerced into casting a par-
ticular voting pattern. The attack presented in this paper uses a similar feature,
namely the large number of possible votes, but in a different way. Hence there is
already some literature on how to compute a verifiable STV tally using crypto-
graphic methods without revealing individual votes [2]. These mechanisms would
also address the attack described in this paper, though they remain computa-
tionally intensive and not integrated into the Australian electoral process.
A.2 Estonia
A discussion related to the attack took place in Estonia in 2011 when an in-
valid i-vote was experienced for the first time in the history of Estonian i-voting
system. The discussion is presented in [5] 3.1 Case: Invalid I-vote. Executive
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summary follows. One of the i-votes was registered invalid by the system during
the tabulation phase of the Parliamentary Elections on March 6th, 2011.
The analysis of the system error logs showed that the invalid i-vote appeared
to be correctly encrypted with the election public key. The reason behind the
invalid i-vote could have been a bug in some of the components of the i-voting
system, human mistake in the system setup or somebody could have intentionally
cast an invalid i-vote (by implementing their own voting client or interfering with
the existing one).
Only human mistake in the setup procedures could be excluded without
decrypting the i-vote, so the National Electoral Committee (NEC) decided to
decrypt the invalid i-vote and examine its contents in hopes to find out the root
cause of the problem. The time window between the decision and the planned
action gave an opportunity to consider invalid i-vote as a possible attack. If the
attacker was aiming for publicity, then the simple scenario allowing manipulation
would be used by the attacker himself to decoy the election officials to show
whether the NEC – contrary to their claims – can find out who did cast the vote
from the contents of the ballot.
If some more sophisticated technique to invalidate the ballot would have
been applied, then the contents of the ballot could have been anything from the
personal identification of the attacker or personal identification of someone not
involved at all to a well formed ballot with an invalid candidate number.
After considering the matter of ballot secrecy and the possibility of an attack
against i-voting as such, the NEC reached the conclusion that it would be better
not to create a precedent of decrypting one i-vote separately from others. The
decision from April 1st was reverted on April 8th.
A.3 Sweden
In Sweden the elections for parliament, county councils, and municipalities all
take place at the same time, but using three distinct ballots and envelopes. Thus,
it is not a bundled election. A voter picks a ballot paper with a pre-printed party
name and a list of persons. He may make a single mark in front of one of the
persons to increase her chances of getting a seat. This is called a “personröst”
(person vote).
Votes are then counted and sieved for invalid votes at several levels and all
counting is open for the public. The ballot papers are first taken out of their
envelopes in the polling station by the election workers. Ballots that are deemed
invalid are put back into their envelopes and put in a separate stack. There
are exceptions, but broadly speaking a ballot is invalid if it is not formed as
described above. The votes are then recounted by another authority before the
final result is announced. During the first counting only party votes are counted
and the person votes are ignored.
The voting system in Sweden has been reformed in several ways in prepara-
tion for the 2018 elections. Fortunately, a side effect of these changes is that the
attack presented in this paper is harder to execute. Before the reform a voter
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could cast a write-in vote for a party or person. As of 2018 all parties and per-
sons must be registered and acknowledge that they are willing to serve if they
are elected.
We remark that parties such as “Kalleankapartiet” (Donald Duck party)
would always receive a couple of votes and the results from the 2014 election are
available at [1]. Although there are no longer any write-in votes, an attacker can
demand to see invalid votes and she could use post-it notes of multiple colors,
corrupt a handful of voters and execute the attack in this way. There is also
a fair number of fringe parties that only get a handful of votes and even more
individuals listed for the parties that get even fewer votes. Thus, there is plenty
of room to encode a key.
The system could be substantially hardened by replacing the public counting
with counting in the presence of a randomly selected set of citizens and by not
reporting results for parties that receive a small number of votes, or reporting
them in an aggregated national way if the number of votes increases notably
by doing this. Furthermore, a threshold could be introduced to register a party
whereby it must be made plausible that it will receive, e.g., a few thousand votes.
Such thresholds are already in place in several countries. A similar approach
could be used for person votes. The reported results should be sanitized and
only contain results for candidates that received a large number of votes, but
this could be challenging for small parties.
A.4 Switzerland
The Swiss electronic voting systems rule out invalid e-votes (votes holding no
valid voting option, such as “yes”, “no”, “candidate A”, “void”) before they are
entered into the “electronic-ballot box” (e-votes to be counted) - there would be
no code shown on the voters’ screen for cast-as-intended verification after casting
the e-vote.
The tally revealing an invalid e-vote would imply a prior malfunction or
attack on the server side. In case the ballot-box holds data that does not corre-
spond with a valid vote, analysis would need to be performed in order to decide
if “number of invalid votes” should be increased by 1 in the final tally, or if the
data would need to be seen just as a chunk of data that is not related to a voter
exercising (“using up”) his right to vote. In any case, such an incident would be
bad.
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